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1 Introduction
Public key cryptography bases its security on mathematical problems that are difficult to
solve such as the discrete logarithm problem or factoring the product of two large primes.
Advances in technology and new discoveries in mathematics make it more feasible to solve
these problems, i.e. it becomes more feasible to break the encryption.1 One solution is to
use larger prime numbers to raise the bar a little higher, but this also translates to more
computation needed to actually use the encryption, making it more inconvenient for the user.
In addition, new mathematical discoveries may suddenly provide an easy way to solve these
problems and therefore render the complete algorithm useless for encryption. Instead, one
might look at cryptographic protocols in which discovering the secret is not only too complex
given the current state of technology but actually impossible. That is, the cryptographic
protocol must be developed with a computationally unlimited attacker in mind. One such
approach involves the use of a random deck of cards. The general scenario is as follows:
Two agents, Alice and Bob, draw a and b cards from a deck of a + b + c cards, and Cathy,
the attacker (a.k.a. Eve, the eavesdropper), receives the remaining c cards. Alice wishes to
communicate her cards to Bob by making a public announcement without informing Cathy of
any of her cards. The generalised problem has parameters (a, b, c) and was inspired by what
van Ditmarsch (2003) has called the Russian Cards problem, which constitutes the (3, 3, 1)
instance and was presented at the Moscow Mathematical Olympiad in 2000.2 There are also
relations to bit-exchange protocols using card deals (Fischer and Wright, 1996) and ‘cards
cryptography’ as in Stiglic (2001).
Previous work on the Russian Cards problem involved using epistemic logic to describe
its properties and to find its solutions (van Ditmarsch, 2003, 2005), including the analysis
of protocols wherein Alice communicates her hand of cards to Bob with more than one
announcement, depending on Bob’s response to her initial announcement. In van Ditmarsch
(2003) it is shown that however Alice structures her announcement, it always corresponds to
an announcement of the form “I hold one of the following hands: . . . ”. The generalised version
has also been investigated by Albert, Aldred, Atkinson, van Ditmarsch, and Handley (2005);
they devise combinatorial analogues CA1, CA2 and CA3 of the epistemic requirements for
Alice to communicate her hand of cards safely to Bob, and they have found various methods
to construct ‘good announcements’ that satisfy these combinatorial axioms.
1Agrawal et al. (2004) show that to determine whether a number is prime can be done in polynomial time.
This is not necessarily related to the complexity of determining whether a number is a product of primes.
2At the time Hans van Ditmarsch did not know that it occurs in Wallis (1988).
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For the (3, 3, 1) instance, suppose Alice announces that she holds one of {012, 034, 056, 135,
246} (by 012 we mean the set {0, 1, 2}, etc.). Her announcements are supposed to be truthful,
and her actual hand must therefore be among those five. No matter which of those Alice holds,
and no matter what Bob holds, he can infer Alice’s cards. For example, if Bob held 126, then
he could eliminate 012, 056, 135 and 246, leaving only 034, that must therefore be Alice’s
actual hand. And no matter what Cathy holds, she cannot infer any card of Alice or Bob. Say
Cathy held card 5, then she could eliminate 056 and 135, leaving her with 012, 034 and 246
for Alice’s hand and (by considering the remaining cards) 346, 126 and 013 for Bob’s hand.
One can establish that the combinatorial axioms CA1, CA2 and CA3 are indeed satisfied,
and that this is therefore a good announcement.
Also for the (3, 3, 1) instance, and supposing Alice holds 034, she could announce that she
holds one of {012, 034, 056, 135, 146, 236, 245}. This is a seven-hand announcement. We can
similarly establish that this is a good announcement.3
Some of the constructions proposed by Albert et al., while not giving away enough infor-
mation for Cathy to determine any card held by Alice or Bob, will result in situations where
Cathy can make an educated guess based on the relative frequency of the cards. For example,
consider again the announcement for (3, 3, 1) given as {012, 034, 056, 135, 246}. Let us assume
that Cathy holds card 3. Then she can exclude all but 012, 056 and 246 from the announce-
ment. Among these, card 2 occurs more often than card 1. In the absence of information on
how Alice’s announcement has been produced by a protocol, and discounting that Alice (of
course) will anticipate such a line of argument, it is reasonable for Cathy to assume that all
of Alice’s holdings are equally likely. But in that case Alice is more likely to hold card 2 than
card 1. In other words: even though the announcement is unbiased with respect to holdings,
the announcement may be biased with respect to card occurrences, or otherwise biased with
respect to patterns in the announcement, and this information may be valued by the eaves-
dropper (attacker) Cathy. The other announcement, {012, 034, 056, 135, 146, 236, 245}, does
not contain card occurrence bias.
From the perspective of cryptography, there appear to be two distinct ways to overcome
such bias: either use protocols that produce announcements that are unbiased for card occur-
rence (or more complex patterns), or use protocols that (may) produce biased announcements
but ensure that there is no relation between patterns in the announcement, such as card oc-
currence, and the actual holding. We focus on the first, in Section 2, using design theory. We
devise an additional requirement for the announcement in order to eliminate the possibility
of making educated guesses. To that effect we propose an additional combinatorial axiom
CA4. We give a method to design announcements that meet this requirement, unbiased an-
nouncements therefore, and we prove some relevant results. Those are our main contributions.
Additionally, in Section 3, we present unbiased protocols for the (3, 3, 1) case, counteracting
single card occurrence bias in announcements.
2 Unbiased announcements
2.1 Combinatorial axiom CA4
We will use terminology as in Albert et al. (2005). Cards are commonly referred to as points,
are all distinct, and are labeled with consecutive natural numbers. The set of all cards (or
3This exact solution is found on the very first page of Wallis (1988).
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deck of cards) is denoted by Ω. An i-set is a set of i cards. A possible holding (or hand) of
Alice is called a line (in other words, a line is an a-set). Thus, an announcement L by Alice
consists of one or more lines. We write X,Y,Z for i-sets, x, y, z for points in such sets, and in
particular also L for a-sets (lines). Alice, Bob, and Cathy hold, respectively, a, b, and c cards.
These are the parameters of the card deal, for which we write (a, b, c). ‘Elimination’ refers
to Cathy or Bob eliminating those lines from the announcement that are impossible holdings
for Alice because they contain one or more of their own cards.
Albert et al. proposed three axioms CA1, CA2, and CA3, that correspond to the informal
requirements given in the problem description for Alice to inform Bob of her cards. An
announcement satisfying those axioms is called a good announcement. A good announcement
guarantees that it is common knowledge among Alice, Bob, and Cathy that Bob knows Alice’s
holding. The axioms are as follows (CA stands for ‘Combinatorial Axiom’).
CA1 For every b-set X there is at most one line in L that avoids X.
CA2 For every c-set X the lines in L avoiding X have empty intersection.
CA3 For every c-set X the lines in L avoiding X have union consisting of all cards except
those of X.
Combinatorial Axiom 1 states that, given the announcement, Bob must be able to infer
what Alice is holding. In order for Bob to figure out which line of the announcement is Alice’s
holding, he has to eliminate lines from the announcement based on his knowledge of his own
cards. For example, because cards are distinct, if Bob holds card 4, then he can eliminate
all lines that contain card 4 since those cannot be a possible holding of Alice. Similarly,
Bob can eliminate any other line that contains a card that he himself holds. A line in the
announcement that contains none of the cards held by Bob is said to avoid Bob’s hand (here
denoted by b-set X). If there are two or more such lines in the announcement, then Bob is
left with more than one possibility for Alice’s hand and cannot state with certainty which is
the correct one. Therefore, there should be at most one line in the announcement that avoids
Bob’s hand. (As we are assuming that the announcement is truthful and that Alice’s hand is
among the lines, there is even exactly one line that avoids Bob’s hand.)
Combinatorial Axiom 2 states that, given the announcement, Cathy must not be able to
infer any card held by Alice. Cathy employs the same process of eliminating lines from the
announcement as Bob by looking at her own hand (denoted by c-set X). After elimination,
she examines the remaining lines. If there is one card common to all these lines, then Cathy
can conclude that Alice holds that card. So, there must be no card common to all remaining
lines. In other words, all remaining lines taken together must have empty intersection.
Combinatorial Axiom 3 states that, given the announcement, Cathy must not be able to
infer any card held by Bob. If it is not satisfied, there is a card that does not occur among
the lines avoiding Cathy’s holding X. This card is therefore not held by Alice, nor is it held
by Cathy. It must therefore be a card held by Bob.
For parameters (3, 3, 1), the announcements {012, 034, 056, 135, 246} and {012, 034, 056,
135, 146, 236, 245} both satisfy CA1, CA2, and CA3, as can be easily checked. We propose
to distinguish between these announcements by means of another, new, combinatorial axiom.
This is CA4. It expresses absence of card occurrence bias. We also propose yet another
axiom, CA5, that will then be shown equivalent to CA4.
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CA4 For every c-set X there is a number nX such that for every point x /∈ X there are nX
lines in L avoiding X that contain x.
CA5 For every c-set X there is a number mX such that for every point y /∈ X there are mX
b-sets Y avoiding X that contain y and that avoid an L ∈ L also avoiding X.
Combinatorial Axiom 4 states that, given Alice’s announcement and Cathy’s hand of cards, no
card occurs more often than another one in the lines Cathy considers possible. Combinatorial
Axiom 5 states that, given Alice’s announcement and Cathy’s hand of cards, no card occurs
more often than another one in the b-sets Cathy considers possible for Bob.
The new combinatorial axioms become more readable if we introduce additional formali-
sation. Given a collection Z of i-sets Z ⊆ Ω (lines, b-sets, c-sets, ...), the subset of Z with all
points contained in X ⊆ Ω is denoted Z(X), i.e.
Z(X) = {Z ∈ Z | Z ⊆ X}.
On the other hand, the set of i-sets in Z containing (all) points in X is denoted Z[X], i.e.
Z[X] = {Z ∈ Z | X ⊆ Z}.
For Z({x}), write Z(x), and for Z[{x}], write Z[x]; for Z(X ∪ {x}) we write Z(X + x), for
Z({x, y}) we write Z(xy), etc. The complement of X in Ω is X . We combine the notations,
e.g. we write L(X)[x] for the set of lines in L avoiding X and containing x. Finally, somewhat
arbitrarily, b(L(X)) is the set of b-sets Y avoiding X and an L ∈ L also avoiding X, i.e.
b(L(X)) = {Y | Y = Ω−X − L,L ∈ L, L ∩X = ∅}.
We now can rephrase the combinatorial axioms as
Definition 1 (Combinatorial Axioms). We distinguish five axioms.
CA1 For every b-set X: |L(X)| ≤ 1.
CA2 For every c-set X:
⋂
L(X) = ∅.
CA3 For every c-set X:
⋃
L(X) = X.
CA4 For every c-set X there is a number nX such that for every x /∈ X: |L(X)[x]| = nX .
CA5 For every c-set X there is a number mX such that for every x /∈ X: |b(L(X))[x]| = mX .
Announcement {012, 034, 056, 135, 246} does not satisfy CA4. Take X = {5}. The lines
not containing 5 (i.e., avoiding {5}) are 012, 034 and 246. Two of those contain 2 but only
one line contains 1. Therefore, no number n5 (i.e., n{5}) exists in this case. On the other
hand, announcement {012, 034, 056, 135, 146, 236, 245} satisfies CA4, with ny = 2 for all points
y = 0, . . . , 6. E.g., {135, 146, 236, 245} avoid 0; point 1 occurs twice in those, namely in 135
and 146; and so on for other points. Announcement {012, 034, 056, 135, 246} does not satisfy
CA5. Take X = {5}. The b-sets not containing 5 and avoiding one of 012, 034 and 246 are:
346, 126 and 013. Two of those contain a 1 but only one contains a 2. Again, the seven-line
announcement satisfies CA5.
Many other, and more generic, examples can be found using design theory (see Wallis
(1988); Hughes (1962)). The mathematical theory of block designs deals with collections of
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special subsets, called blocks (or lines), of a given set. It provides a convenient framework for
studying the relation between the proposed combinatorial axioms CA4 and CA5. A t-design
with parameters (v, k, λ) has the property that any combination of t distinct elements of a
set of v = |Ω| points occurs in the same number λ of k-blocks (or k-lines). The number
λ is referred to as the covalency of the design. Thus, in 2-designs, also known as balanced
incomplete block designs, any pair of distinct cards occurs in the same number of lines. This is
relevant for our investigation, because it entails that in the subset of lines containing any given
card (such as a singleton c-set), any other card occurs in the same number of lines. Similarly,
in 3-designs any 3-tuple of distinct cards occurs in the same number of lines. This can be
further generalised to 4-designs, 5-designs, etc., but such designs are far less common and few
general constructions are available that may help us here. Every t-design is also a 1-design,
2-design, . . . , (t−1)-design. The seven-hand announcement {012, 034, 056, 135, 146, 236, 245}
is a 2-design, with block size 3 and covalency 1. CA4 can be formulated as
For every c-set X, L(X) is a 1-design with covalency nX .
We can construct designs satisfying CA4 using the various methods known for constructing
designs, such as from projective planes and binary designs. Incidental results are reported in
Yates (1936) and Bose (1939). For details, we refer to Roehling (2005). Here, we only show
how binary designs can be used to construct announcements satisfying CA4.
Binary designs Binary designs give solutions for a = 2n−1, b = a− 1, and c = 1, for n ≥ 3.
Here, n is the number of bits used in the construction. These designs are special because
the same n may be associated with more than one instance of the (a, b, c) parameters. For
example, (8, 7, 1) (satisfying the above for n = 4) and (8, 6, 2) have the same solution given by
a binary design with n = 4. In Theorem 7, later, we prove that binary designs are 3-designs.4
This is sufficient to guarantee that CA4 is satisfied when c = 1, using another result, Theorem
2.
Binary designs are constructed as follows. Choose a number of bits n ≥ 3. For all 2n − 1
n-bit vectors (y1, y2, ..., yn) (except all zeros) solve the equation x1y1 + x2y2 + ...+ xnyn = 0,
where xi = 0, 1. There are 2
n−1 solutions to each equation, each x1x2...xn representing a point
in binary. The points gained from an equation together constitute a line. This produces 2n−1
lines (one per equation). For each line, compute the complement by taking all binary points
that are not present in the line; these complements are also taken as lines. Now we have a
total of 2(2n − 1) lines which constitute the announcement. To get the final announcement
using our format, replace every point in binary with its decimal representation.
For an example, we construct a binary design with n = 3.5 Each line consists of 2n−1 = 4
points. The 2n − 1 = 7 non-zero 3-bit vectors are 001, 010, 011, 100, 101, 110, 111. The two
lines corresponding to the first vector are {000, 010, 100, 110} (in decimal notation {0, 2, 4, 6},
i.e. 0246) and {001, 011, 101, 111} (in decimal 1357). Proceed similarly for the remaining 3-bit
vectors. The resulting announcement consisting of the 2(2n − 1) = 14 lines is
{0246, 0145, 0347, 0123, 0257, 0167, 0356, 1357, 2367, 1256, 4567, 1346, 2345, 1247}
Given parameters (4, 3, 1), this announcement L satisfies CA4: for all points y, ny = 4. For
example, for y = 0 we get L(0) = {4567, 2367, 2345, 1357, 1346, 1256, 1247} and all other
4Specifically, they are 3-(2n, 2n−1, 1) designs.
5These are originally known as Steiner quadruples (Colbourn and Dinitz, 1996, p.71).
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points occur exactly four times in this set: point 1 in the last four lines, point 2 in lines 2, 3,
6, and 7; etc.
Apart from CA4, which for parameters (a, b, 1) amounts to checking whether L(x) is a 1-
design for arbitrary x, one could imagine strengthening the requirements, for example, demand
that L(x) is a 2-design for all points x as well. We have already seen that the seven-hand
announcement for (3, 3, 1) also satisfies this requirement. We will feature a result for this
stronger requirement in the next section, in Theorem 9.
2.2 Theoretical results
Theorem 1. CA4 if and only if CA5.
Proof. Assume CA4 holds. Let X be any set of c points. For every line L in L(X) there is
a b-set Ω − X − L in b(L(X)). Therefore, |b(L(X))| = |L(X)|. Also, for all points y ∈ X,
if y ∈ Y ∈ L(X) then y 6∈ Z ∈ b(L(X)) where Z = Ω − Y − X. Point y occurs in nX
lines in L(X). It therefore does not occur in nX lines in b(L(X)), and it therefore occurs in
|b(L(X))| −nX lines in b(L(X)). As this is for arbitrary y, this defines the number mX . The
argument runs both ways.
In other words, we can forget about CA5 from here on.
Theorem 2. Let c = 1. (CA4 holds and L is a 1-design) if and only if L is a 2-design.
Proof. Assume L is a 1-design and that CA4 holds, and that c = 1. CA4 says that every L(x)
is a 1-design. Its size |L(x)| is independent of x, as L is a 1-design. For arbitrary y ∈ L(x),
|L(x)[y]| + |L[x + y]| = |L[y]| (note that |L[x + y]| = |L[x][y]|). As |L(x)[y]| and |L(y)| are
independent of x and y (by CA4, and because L is a 1-design, respectively), so is |L[x+ y]|.
Therefore L is a 2-design.
Assume L is a 2-design, i.e. |{L ∈ L | x, y ∈ L}| = λ2 is independent of x and y. We
want to show that |{L ∈ L(x) | z ∈ L}| = nx is independent of z, for any holding x of Cathy.
Note that when she eliminates lines from L that contain x, she reduces the number of lines
containing any y 6= x by λ2. Let λ1 = |{L ∈ L | y ∈ L}|, which is independent of y because
L is also a 1-design. Before elimination λ1 lines contained y. After elimination, λ1 − λ2 lines
contain y. This is the number of lines nx in L(x) that contain y. Since it is independent of
y, CA4 holds.
Theorem 3. If CA4 holds then nX =
a|L(X)|
a+b .
Proof. Count the total number of cards occurring in L(X) in two ways. Assuming CA4 holds
there are a+ b distinct cards and each of them occurs nX times. There are |L(X)| lines and
each of them contains a cards. Thus (a+ b)nX = a|L(X)|.
Theorem 4. Let c = 1. If CA4 holds then nX is independent of X.
Proof. Assume c = 1 and CA4 holds. Take two arbitrary distinct X1 = {x1} and X2 = {x2}.
Consider L(x1). It contains no lines that contain card x1 and nx1 lines that contain card x2.
It must therefore contain |L(x1)| − nx1 lines that contain neither card x1 nor card x2. And
due to construction of the set, this is the exact number of lines in L that contain neither card.
Now consider L(x2). It contains no lines that contain card x2 and nx2 lines that contain card
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x1. It must therefore contain |L(x2)| − nx2 lines that contain neither card x1 nor card x2.
And due to construction of the set, this is the exact number of lines in L that contain neither
card. Thus, we get the following equation
|L(x1)| − nx1 = |L(x2)| − nx2
nx1
a+ b
a
− nx1 = nx2
a+ b
a
− nx2
nx1
(
a+ b
a
− 1
)
= nx2
(
a+ b
a
− 1
)
nx1
(
b
a
)
= nx2
(
b
a
)
nx1 = nx2
Because x1 and x2 were chosen arbitrarily we conclude that nx is independent of x.
The following follow directly from Theorems 3 and 4.
Corollary 5. If CA4 holds, then |L(x)| is independent of x.
Corollary 6. If CA4 holds, |L(x)| is independent of x if and only if nx is independent of x.
Theorem 7. Binary designs are 3-designs.6
Proof. By construction binary designs are based on 2n points and 2(2n−1) lines of size 2n−1.
We now show that any three points p1, p2, p3 occur in exactly 2
n−2− 1 lines. The lines of the
design contain points of the form x1x2 . . . xn, that is, a point is represented by an n-vector x.
For any n-vector y 6= 0 there is a line {x | y ·x = 0} which we call bx0 and a line {x | y ·x = 1}
which we call bx1. Let the n-vectors u,v,w be three distinct points in these lines. A line
containing these comes from a vector y with either y · u = 0 and y · v = 0 and y · w = 0,
in the case of bx0 (equation i); or y · u = 1 and y · v = 1 and y ·w = 1, in the case of bx1
(equation ii). We now have two cases:
1. One of u,v,w is the sum of the other two. Then u,v,w form a subspace U of the vector
space V of dimension n over the field of 2 elements. The subspace U has dimension 2.
Note that the bx0’s come from U
⊥ = {y | y · t = 0 for all t ∈ U} and that dimU +
dimU⊥ = n. Therefore, the dimension of U⊥ is n−2 and the number of bx0’s is 2
n−2−1
(excluding y = 0). The number of bx1’s is 0 because Equation ii cannot hold.
2. The vectors u,v,w are linearly independent. Then u,v,w form a subspace of dimension
3 and by the same argument as above the number of bx0’s is 2
n−3 − 1. The number of
bx1’s is 2
n−3 because we just find one b0 for which Equation ii holds and then add all
the bx0’s.
In both cases the number of lines that contain the three points is 2n−2 − 1 in total. Thus,
binary designs are 3-designs.
Corollary 8. A binary design will satisfy CA4 for c = 1.
6This is an original proof. But we find it likely that this is a known result in design theory. We did not find
a reference to binary designs as an infinite family of 3-designs in either Wallis (1988) or Colbourn and Dinitz
(1996), except for the already mentioned specific case for n = 3: Steiner quadruples.
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Proof. Directly from Theorem 2 and Theorem 7.
Theorem 9. L is a 3-design if and only if L(x) is a 2-design for all points x and L is a
1-design.
Proof. Let L be a 3-design. Trivially, it is also a 2-design, and also a 1-design. The last
satisfies one proof obligation. As L is a 3-design, |L[yzx]| is independent of y, z, x. As L is a
2-design, |L[yz]| is independent of y, z; and therefore independent of y, z, x (note that x does
not occur at all in |L[yz]|). As |L[yz]| = |L[yzx]|+ |L[yz](x)|, also |L[yz](x)| is independent
of y, z, x, i.e., for every x, L(x) is a 2-design.
Assume L(x) is a 2-design for all x, and that L is a 1-design. Similarly to above it
immediately follows that L is a 3-design.
Corollary 10. Binary designs L satisfy that L(x) is a 2-design for all points x.
Proof. Directly, from Theorems 7 and 9.
3 Unbiased protocols
In the previous section we focussed on avoiding bias in an announcement. Such bias resulted
from the overrepresentation of certain patterns, such as single cards, or pairs of cards, or
triples, in the announcement or in the remaining lines avoiding a given c-set (eavesdropper
Cathy’s hand of cards). Announcements where arbitrary c-set avoiding lines always are 1-
designs, or 2-designs, or 3-designs (respectively), guarantee that such bias is absent. The
suggested link between overrepresentation of patterns (such as individual card occurrence)
in an announcement and the probability of that pattern occurring in the actual holding
is, of course, that each line in an announcement is equally likely to be the actual holding.
Given an underlying protocol to produce such an announcement, this is achieved when each
announcement resulting from the protocol’s execution is equally likely to be produced. In the
absence of information to the contrary, that may be a reasonable assumption.
But another way to avoid bias in cryptographic communication is to apply a protocol
that takes such overrepresentation of patterns in announcements into account. By making
that protocol public, the sender and receiver can then unbias the announcement—but just
as well they may keep it secret, and in that case have a cutting edge over an unsuspecting
eavesdropper. In other words, by applying protocols that make some lines in an announcement
more likely to be the actual holding than others, the sender can also remove bias. In this
section we investigate that matter. Our results are less general than those in the previous
section: we present two different ‘unbiasing’ protocols for parameters (3, 3, 1). To investigate
unbiased announcements, we have over 100 years of design theory to comfortably fall back
on. But the investigation of unbiased protocols to produce card deal announcements has not
been investigated in a combinatorial setting, as far as we know.
Given parameters (3, 3, 1), consider again the five-hand announcement {012, 034, 056, 135, 246}.
There are 60 different five-line announcements containing an arbitrary actual hand (van Ditmarsch,
2003, p.56).7 In a five-line announcement exactly one point will occur thrice. Suppose 012
is the actual hand. Of the 60 announcements containing 012, 36 contain an actual card 0, 1,
7One of the seven points has to occur thrice in the announcement. In case this is one of the three actual
cards, one of the three lines containing it will be the actual hand, the four remaining points are distributed
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or 2 thrice; the remaining 24 therefore contain another card three times. Therefore, a point
occurring thrice in this five-line announcement is more likely to be an actual card. A protocol
randomly selecting an announcement containing the actual hand therefore propagates this
bias, and could rightfully be called a biased protocol. We now adjust (‘debias’) the protocol
as follows (‘choose’ always means ‘randomly choose’):
Fact 11 (Unbiased five-hand announcement). Given are parameters (3, 3, 1). Given an actual
hand, choose one among the 36 five-hand announcements containing an actual card thrice,
and choose one among the 24 not containing an actual card thrice. Now choose between
those two. Given this protocol, there is no relation between the triple point occurrence in the
announcement and the actual cards.
Given that one point occurs thrice in a five line announcement, and given that this is
supposed to be meaningless information, sender Alice might as well make public which point
that will always be, before being dealt a hand of cards, and then execute some protocol
resulting in an announcement containing that actual hand, and the pre-announced point
thrice, whether it is in the actual hand or not.8 Unfortunately, if we then choose among all
such lines, the exact same bias as before again results:
Given an arbitrary point and an arbitrary line (actual hand), the probability that that
point avoids that line is 67 ·
5
6 ·
4
5 =
4
7 , so that the probability that the point is in the line, is
3
7 . There are twelve announcements where the pre-announced point is an actual card, and six
where this is not the case.9,10 As 12 · 37 =
36
7 , and 6 ·
4
7 =
24
7 , our bias is again as before: the
odds are 3 to 2 that a point occurring in an announcement is an actual card. But again, we
can adjust the protocol, a bit differently now:
over the other two of the three. Given an assignment of any of those four, we can choose one of the remaining
three to match it. That determines the third of those lines too. Suppose that i is the chosen actual card,
j, k the other actual cards, and that the other two lines containing it are ilm and ino. Now consider the two
lines not containing i. One will contain j, the other k. For the line containing j we can choose one (out of
two) l,m and one (out of two) n, o. That determines the fifth hand too. Altogether: 3 · 3 · 2 · 2 = 36. Else,
in case the triple point occurrence is not an actual card, but one of the four other points; say l. This fixes
the lines not containing that point: one of those is now the actual hand, say ijk again, and the other contains
the remaining three points, m,n, o. Consider the three lines containing l. Points (actual cards) i, j, k must be
in three different lines containing l. For any of those, we can now choose between 3 of the remaining points
m,n, o, and for another of those, between two of the points still remaining after that choice. Altogether:
4 · 3 · 2 = 24.
8Suggested by Ron van der Meyden
9In the first case, as before, the four remaining points are distributed over the other two of the three:
3 · 2 · 2 = 12. Else, also as before, the three actual cards must be in the three different lines containing the
preselected point, and for any of those, our options are: 3 · 2 = 6.
10Let 0 be the publicly known thrice occurring point. In the first case, let 012 be the arbitrary line containing
0. The twelve announcements are:
012 034 056 135 246 012 034 056 136 245
012 034 056 145 236 012 034 056 146 235
012 035 046 134 256 012 035 046 136 245
012 035 046 145 236 012 035 046 156 234
012 036 045 134 256 012 036 045 135 246
012 036 045 146 235 012 036 045 156 234
On the other hand, let 135 be the arbitrary line not containing 0. Note that this fixes the other line not
containing 0. The 6 announcements are:
012 034 056 135 246 012 036 045 135 246
014 023 056 135 246 014 025 036 135 246
016 023 045 135 246 016 025 034 135 246
9
Fact 12 (Unbiased five-hand announcement with special point). Given are parameters (3, 3, 1).
Choose one among the twelve possible announcements if the selected thrice occurring point is
an actual card, and choose one among the six announcements that are possible if this is not
the case. Choose between those two with probability 47 for the first and
3
7 for the second.
We close with an additional observation on the status of such protocols. If they are public,
the combination of the protocol and a resulting announcement makes that announcement
unbiased for an eavesdropper with regard to single point occurrence. If they are not public,
but, for example, only known between sender and receiver, the situation becomes much more
complex. For example, in the absence of information to the contrary, the eavesdropper may
incorrectly assume that each line in an announcement equally likely, and from that (correctly)
infer that a thrice occurring point is therefore more likely to be an actual card. But this
conclusion is then false. Also, if the sender assumes that the eavesdropper follows that line
of argument, it would even make sense not to apply an unbiased protocol, but one that is
even biased the other way, namely towards triple occurrence of points that are not actual
points. Then again, the eavesdropper may anticipate such behaviour of the sender, etc.
In other words, the optimal strategies for sender and eavesdropper under conditions where
announcements are always truthful but knowledge of applied protocols is incomplete, are
unclear.
On the other hand, incomplete knowledge of a protocol is an unreasonable assumption
in our current setting: given the ‘worst case’ assumption where eavesdroppers intercept the
entire communication, in other words, where it is a public communication, we might as well
assume the ‘worst case’ concerning protocol knowledge: the protocol is public.
4 Conclusions
We outlined the need for stricter requirements for cryptographic protocols inspired by the
Russian cards problem. A new requirement CA4 has been proposed. This is shown to be
equivalent to an alternative requirement CA5. All announcements found to satisfy CA4 are
2-designs. We have also shown that all binary designs are 3-designs. Instead of avoiding
bias in announcements produced by such protocols, one may as well apply unbiased protocols
such that patterns in announcements become meaningless. We gave two examples of such
protocols for card deal parameters (3, 3, 1).
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